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DRM Must Be Curbed
A Cambridge academic has told MPs that they need to legislate to prevent large corporations abusing DRM technology to place excessive restrictions on what users can do with digital content once they've purchased it. Ross Anderson was speaking to the All-Party Parliamentary Internet Group.
The call follows the outcry over Sony's 'rootkit' technology, incorporated on music CDs to prevent copying, was found to contain vulnerabilities that could be exploited by viruses, for example.
Libraries are also expressing fears about inflexible DRM implementations which could prevent them from exercising their 'fair-use' exemption from copyright laws, and even from archiving old works where the copyright has expired.
Follow up:
Anderson suggested that Parliament could look at the Unfair Contracts act to combat this. Almost all software providers attach End User Licence Agreements that are (possibly deliberately) excessively verbose, palcing huge and potentially unfair restrictions on what users can and can't do with the software. As you're reading this now, can you think of one occasion where you've actually read the whole EULA on anything you've downloaded or installed? Didn't think so. My belief is that they're made unnecessarily long to make sure people don't read them.
But sure they're only protecting their work? Wrong. Once I've bought a CD I should be allowed to play it on my PC (or any PC), on my MP3 player, my iPod, my DVD player or wherever else I choose. Why should the record companies be allowed to tell me I can only listen to it where and when they want me to?
If you read the story you'll see a mention of Lynn Holdsworth, visually impaired, who bought an eBook from Amazon only to find that the DRM software in it wouldn't allow her computer to read it aloud to her. Nice touch.
"DRM doesn't just affect music, it also locks your printer cartridge, and eventually it will lock your spare car parts to your car. Governments and courts will need a wide-ranging approach to this issue, and can't just rely on fudges created for individual cases."
Ross Anderson, security engineering professor, Cambridge University